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I.  Introduction 
 
 The common law of agency imposes duties that principal and agent owe to each other, 
including an agent’s fiduciary duties to the principal. Although not mirror images, these duties 
usually run parallel in duration because most of the time, a principal’s duties, like an agent’s, are 
coterminous with the relationship. This Chapter explores situations in which temporal lines of 
demarcation do less work. The absence of a fully formed relationship of agency does not mean 
that the parties owe each other no duties of any sort. Likewise, a relationship’s end does not 
obviate continuing obligations stemming from the now-concluded relationship. The character 
and content of duties on the peripheral edges of relationships vary, as do the justifications for 
imposing duties and whether they are derived from doctrines apart from agency law. 
 
*David F. Cavers Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. Portions of this 
Chapter expand on points made more briefly in Deborah A. DeMott, Fiduciary Principles in 
Agency Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & 
Robert H. Sitkoff, eds. 2018). An earlier version benefitted from discussions at the 2019 
Fiduciary Law workshop and the editorial conference for this book, the Tokyo University Law 
Faculty Private Law Forum and the Trust Future Forum, Kansai, and the Altara Kaufman 2018 
Conference on Global Perspectives on Fiduciary Law at IDC Herzliya; and from the comments 
of Howell Jackson and other colleagues. 
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Additionally, issues at the temporal edges of agency relationships vary in whether their 
resolution yields to bright-line determinations or requires fact-specific and nuanced inquiries. 
The ubiquity of agency relationships—spanning otherwise-disparate contexts, including 
organizational settings—makes these issues matter.1 
 Among fiduciary relationships, agency is distinctive because both principal and agent 
hold ongoing power to terminate the relationship at will, albeit in breach of contract. The 
distinctive structure of agency—empowering both parties to act unilaterally to end their 
relationship, often preceded by a process of reflection and planning—assures the presence of 
issues about duties on the periphery of termination. This dimension of agency’s distinctive 
structure has implications for broader accounts of fiduciary obligation, especially those grounded 
in cognitive dimensions of an actor’s loyalty. Agency doctrine generally permits an employee or 
other agent to plan to compete with the principal following termination; but empowered to end 
the relationship at any time, an agent’s commitment to it may always appear contingent, at least 
as seen in retrospect by a now-former principal. Of course, a principal who appreciates agency’s 
implications may attempt to structure the relationship’s terms to protect its interests. 
Additionally, agency doctrine, applicable to ongoing relationships between parties whose 
 
1See Great Minds v. Fedex Office & Print Servs., Inc., 886 F.3d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 2018) 
2018)(noting “mundane ubiquity” of agency relationships;  licensor’s counsel failed to address 
agency relationships linking licensees with non-employee copying service when terms of license, 
which permitted reproduction and distribution for non-commercial purposes by licensee, did not 
prohibit delegation whether to licensee’s employees or non-employee agents).  
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perspectives and preferences may shift over time, accommodates interim bargaining to adjust a 
relationship’s terms going forward, each party always empowered to exit. This is not the 
structure that underlies what’s often assumed to be the prototype for a fiduciary relationship, a 
donative trust.   
 The Chapter opens by sketching aspects of the formation and termination of common-law 
agency relationships. Requiring no formality to create, agency relationships are also relatively 
fragile, in contrast with legal relationships grounded in property interests, donative trusts, 
limited-liability entities, or bilateral contract. Next, the Chapter identifies and examines the 
distinct bases on which agents might owe duties to prospective principals, including the 
possibility of a distinct status or category, “agent-in-waiting,” with the consequence that 
fiduciary duties would apply to all actors within the category. The Chapter then examines the 
duties owed by principals and agents following the termination of an agency relationship as well 
as the more contestable stage that precedes termination. Implications for more general or 
theoretical accounts of fiduciary law conclude.  
II. The formation and termination of agency relationships 
 Agency relationships are distinctive among fiduciary relationships, including those, like 
agency, for which fiduciary character is ascribed by status or legal convention.2 Outside these 
settled categories, courts impose fiduciary duties in particular relationships in response to  
specific circumstances, in particular the potential for opportunism and abuse when one party 
 
2On status-based fiduciary relationships, see Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller, 
Introduction, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 1, 2-3 (2014). 
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invites and a vulnerable party reposes trust.3 As Daniel Kelly observes, these cases usually fall 
“along the borderline ... between an arms-length transaction, in which each party may act 
according to its own self-interest, and a fiduciary relationship, in which the law requires a party 
to act in the sole or best interests of another.” 4 A signal trait of agency law is the relative ease 
and informality with which two parties may create an agency relationship and, later on, exit from 
it. The common law defines agency as “the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a 
‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the 
principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or 
otherwise consents so to act.”5 Creating a common-law agency relationship does not require 
compliance with specified formalities, such as the execution of a written instrument, nor does it 
require any filing with the state comparable to the requisites to form a corporation or other type 
of limited-liability business entity. In this respect an agency relationship resembles a general 
partnership, which is formed when parties agree to co-own a business for profit and requires no 
compliance with specified formalities. The parties’ intention to formalize their relationship later 
on, structuring it through a to-be-formed limited-liability entity, does not preclude the existence 
of a general partnership.6  
 
3See Daniel B. Kelly, Fiduciary Principles in Fact-Based Fiduciary Relationships, in 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 12 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds. 2019).    
4Id. at 4. 
5RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
6 For implications, see Christine Hurt, Startup Partnerships, 69 B.C. L. Rev. __ 
(forthcoming). 
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 Agency law also enables principal and agent, as between themselves, to define the scope 
of their relationship, including by specifying domains in which the agent may act free of 
fiduciary duties to the principal.7 More generally, the law recognizes that another type of legal 
relationship—such as a debtor-creditor relationship—may co-exist with agency and confer rights 
on the agent to act in ways contrary to the principal’s interests, as would a securities broker who 
liquidates an over-margined account notwithstanding the client’s objections.8 The law also 
recognizes relationships that resemble agency’s most basic consequence because one actor’s 
conduct affects the legal position of another but the agent-like actor has an economic interest 
distinct from the relationship that privileges actions taken solely to benefit that actor and that 
supports contractual provisions controlling when and how the relationship may be terminated.9 
Corporate law acknowledges and defines roles for an important category of agents, corporate 
officers.     
 Although agency is consensual, an enforceable contract between principal and agent need 
not accompany or underlie its creation; many agency relationships are formed gratuitously.10 
Thus, a relationship of common-law agency may link an agent to a principal prior to any an 
 
7For these possibilities, see Deborah A. DeMott, Defining Agency and Its Scope (II), in 
COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW 396 (Larry A. DiMatteo & Martin Hogg, eds., 2016). 
8For more on the defined scope of agency relationships, see id. at 403. 
9RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.12. Conventional examples are powers, given as 
security, to protect a legal or equitable title held by the power’s holder, as well as powers to 
exercise voting rights associated with securities or membership interests.  
10Id. § 1.01, cmt. d. 
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enforceable contract. As a consequence, agency relationships can arise with fluidity and lack the 
harder-edged moment of formation or initiation integral to conventional accounts of contract 
formation.11 Some agents—corporate officers, for example—may commence acting in a de facto 
capacity, in advance of compliance with formal requisites, including those imposed by a firm’s 
governance documents.12 Many contemporary statutes enable agency-like relationships typified 
by precisely-drawn triggers that initiate the relationship and the duties that follow, such as 
durable powers of attorney.13 
 Simple to form, agency relationships are also terminable at will by either principal or 
agent, albeit in breach of any contract between them. A principal has power to terminate the 
agent’s actual authority to act on the principal’s behalf by making a manifestation of revocation 
to the agent. Likewise, an agent has power, through a manifestation to the principal, to terminate 
 
11For a critique of hinging contractual obligations on “a specific hypothetical moment of 
contract formation,” see Shawn J. Bayern, The Nature and Timing of Contract Formation, in 
COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW 77, 88. 
12See In re the Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 48 (Del. 2006)(defining 
“de facto officer” as “one who actually assumes possession of an office under the claim and 
color of an election or appointment and who is actually discharging the duties of that office, but 
for some legal reason lacks de jure legal title to that office.” 
13See Estate of Alford v. Shelton, 89 N.E.3d 391(Ill. 2017)(applying Ill. Comp. Stat. 
45/2-10.3(a)(West 2010); child designated as successor agent in parents’ durable powers of 
attorney owed no fiduciary duties prior to exit of original agent).  
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their relationship by renouncing authority.14 More vividly, “you’re fired” and “I quit” operate as 
performative utterances to end an agency relationship, even when a contract between the parties 
provides otherwise.15 
  Why are common-law agency relationships so relatively fragile? And why does agency 
law privilege one party’s present preferences over both parties’ inconsistent earlier preferences to 
bind themselves to an ongoing relational commitment? The underlying premise of agency is 
consent, in particular, the principal’s consent on an ongoing basis to legally-effectual 
representation by the agent. By revoking an agent’s actual authority, the principal retrieves or 
calls back an extension of the principal’s own legal personality.16 Renouncing and thereby 
terminating an agency relationship also frees the agent from most constraints imposed by the 
 
14RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY. § 3.10. If the “agent” instead holds a power given 
as security, it may be made irrevocable, typically by a term in the written instrument creating or 
evidencing the power. Id. § 3.12. 
15Unless, as discussed above, the “agent” holds a power expressly made irrevocable that 
is supported by a distinct economic interest. 
16For this rationale, see Francis Reynolds, When is an Agent’s Authority Irrevocable?, in 
MAKING COMMERCIAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROY GOODE 259, 259 (Ross Cranston, ed., 
1997). On the implications of understanding an agent as an extension of the principal’s legal 
personality—and not as a substitute for the principal—see Deborah A. DeMott, The Fiduciary 
Character of Agency and the Interpretation of Instructions, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
FIDUCIARY LAW 321, 322 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014)(hereinafter DeMott, 
Fiduciary Character).   
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relationship, including the agent’s duty to comply with the principal’s lawful instructions and the 
agent’s fiduciary duty of loyalty to the principal. Possessing a unilateral power to terminate 
should lower a prospective agent’s anticipated costs of undertaking to act on behalf of  any 
particular principal, including an employer. Although the agent may be obliged to forego 
attractive opportunities during the relationship, opportunities of the same type may rightfully 
become available once the agent exits the relationship.17  
 Agency doctrine overall mixes immutable characteristics—including the agent’s 
fiduciary duties to the principal and the unilateral powers held by principal and agent to 
terminate the relationship—with those subject to agreement between agent and principal, 
including agreements defining the scope of the agency relationship to privilege conduct by the 
agent that would otherwise breach the agent’s duties to the principal, as discussed above. Thus, 
subject to limits grounded in public policy concerns, an agent may agree not to compete with the 
principal following termination.18 An agreement may also contain provisions that price out the 
cost to the agent of early termination by the principal, as in many executive employment 
agreements. In other relationships, contract provisions—typically drafted by the agent—may 
impose fees on the principal if the principal terminates the relationship within a set period. 
Termination or exit fees charged by asset managers (“investment advisers” in the United States), 
although fairly common, can be problematic.19 Assets under management in a client’s account 
 
17RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.10, cmt. b. 
18Id. § 8.04, cmt. b. 
19Jason Zweig, The Intelligent Investor: Should You Have to Pay A Fee to Fire an 
Adviser?, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2014. 
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belong to the client as principal, not the manager, who holds the assets as an agent who is the 
client’s fiduciary. Often clients exit a management relationship when they’re unhappy with the 
manager, which implies that an exit fee can operate as a penalty geared to retain clients and can  
function inconsistently with the adviser/manager’s fiduciary duty to place the clients’ interests 
before its own as their agent.           
 Just as a prospective agent may owe duties to the principal prior to the formation of an 
agency relationship or a contract encapsulating the parties’ agreement, terminating an agency 
relationship does not end all duties the parties owe each other. Some linger post-termination, 
echoing the operation of an agent’s “lingering authority” to bind the principal, that is, the 
appearance of authority that may survive following the termination of actual authority.20 
Additionally, when an agent contemplates terminating the relationship—perhaps in the prospect 
of competing with the principal—the agent’s commitment to the principal and orientation toward 
its interests may no longer be as whole-hearted as loyalty requires as assessed in retrospect by 
the now-former principal. Even when the agent’s conduct does not contravene duties of loyalty, 
investing effort and ingenuity to prepare for new adventures can sap the agent’s diligence on 
behalf of the (present) principal.21  
 Long-established doctrine permits an agent to take otherwise-lawful steps to prepare to 
 
20RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.11 and cmt. c. “Lingering authority” requires 
that the third party’s belief that the agent acts with authority be reasonable. Id. 
21An agent’s duties of performance require that the agent “act with the care, competence, 
and diligence normally exercised by agents in similar circumstances,” subject to any agreement 
with the principal. Id. § 8.08. 
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compete once an agency relationship is terminated,22 and to do so without disclosure to the 
principal.23 When preparations to compete overlap with continued service, ambiguity can cloud 
inquiries into the agent’s conduct and motives. For example, consider an agent/employee whose 
duties require visible interactions with major customers of the principal/employer’s business. 
When the agent is especially responsive and effective in customer-facing interactions, was the 
agent motivated to solidify a relationship that will follow her to a competitor? Or simply to do 
good work on behalf of the principal?24 As elaborated below, permissible (and secret) 
preparations to compete imply that an agent’s duty of loyalty to the principal, or at least its scope 
or intensity, may diminish when the agent contemplates ending the relationship. Of course, if an 
agent abandons her plan and decides to stay, the duty of loyalty should resume its earlier 
 
22Id. § 8.04; accord, RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.04, cmt. c. (AM. LAW INST. 
2015). 
23An agent’s duties include “a duty to use reasonable effort to provide the principal with 
facts that the agent knows...when the facts are material to the agent’s duties to the principal ....” 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11. This general duty does not encompass the fact that 
the agent plans to compete with the principal. Id. § 8.04, cmt. c. Nor does the agent’s fiduciary 
duty of loyalty require disclosure. Id.   
24Id. § 8.04, cmt. c. Overall, if an agent who plans to exit does not explicitly solicit the 
principal’s customers or employees to join the competing enterprise, the fact that customers or 
employees follow the agent does not establish disloyalty on the agent’s part; excellent work 
performance itself is not an indicium of disloyalty. Mercer Mgmt. Consulting, Inc. v. Wilde, 920 
F. Supp. 219, 234 (D.D.C. 1996).   
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dimensions.        
 The prospect of fiduciary duties that precede the formation of an agency relationship, like 
the duties that linger following termination and that may dim if not lessen preceding termination, 
complicates schematic accounts of fiduciary relationships that position parties at arms length 
prior to and following a relationship. A visual or mechanical metaphor may help conceptualize 
these peripheral duties: the purchaser of a switch to control an electric light has a choice between 
an on-off toggle function, or a dimmer control through a rheostat that enables a user to vary the 
light’s degrees of brightness. Agency doctrine operates at times more like a dimmer switch than 
an on-off toggle, in particular in the inception and expiration of fiduciary duties. This lack of 
precise demarcation increases the need for fact-specific inquiries to resolve disputed situations, a 
consequence not unique to agency law.25 Bright-line determinations are not absent from cases 
applying agency law, just not universal. 
III. Agents’ duties preceding agency relationships 
 Prospective principals and agents owe duties to each other derived from other bodies of 
law, including tort law. In one line of cases, an employee of a brokerage firm defrauds investors 
who are not—or at least not yet—clients of the firm, acting without either actual or apparent 
authority to bind the firm and through transactions that explicitly are not conducted through the 
firm. But the employee’s association with the firm enabled the employee to identify prospects to 
 
25For an example, see Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance on the Fringes of Marriage, 2018 
UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 235, 276 (2018)(observing that “[t]he simple truth is that persons enter and 
leave our lives at times distinct from crowning acts”). 
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defraud, while a known association with the firm lent plausibility to the employee’s conduct. In 
the brokerage context, it’s well established that an agency relationship begins only when a client 
places an order and the broker agrees to execute it.26 However, if the firm acted negligently in 
hiring its employee—perhaps one with a prior history of client complaints or regulatory 
infractions—or in supervising or retaining the employee, the firm could be subject to liability on 
a tort theory. Accepting this theory, a recent case analogized the premise for the brokerage firm’s 
liability to the liability of a burglar alarm company that hires, as a door-to-door salesman, a felon 
known to be violent who kidnaps a prospective alarm-system customer.27 An employee’s fraud 
also subjects the employee to liability to the prospective customer. The brokerage firm’s liability 
is direct, not vicarious; the employee acted without actual or apparent authority on behalf of the 
firm but the firm itself, if negligent, is subject to liability.28 
 Apart from law of general applicability, prospective agents are subject to duties to 
prospective principals in particular domains. Relationships between lawyers and prospective 
clients are instructive, given that lawyers are treated as their clients’ agents for many purposes.29 
Only to a client does a lawyer owe the full complement of duties that reflect the fiduciary 
 
26Le Marchant v. Moore, 44 N.E. 770 (N.Y. 1896); In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & 
“ERISA” Litig., 238 F. Supp. 3d 799, 843 (S.D. Tex. 2017).  
27Owens v. Stifel Nicholaus & Co., 650 Fed. App’x 764 (11th Cir. 2016)(discussing 
salience of Underberg v. Southern Alarm, Inc., 643 S.E. 2d 374, 375 (Ga. App. Ct. 2007).   
28RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 (distinguishing between direct and vicarious 
liability).  
29See Deborah A. DeMott, The Lawyer as Agent, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 301 (1998). 
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character of a lawyer-client relationship.30 However, it would be mistaken to assume that a 
lawyer owes a prospective client no legal duties other than those derived from tort law. Lawyers 
owe prospective clients a duty not to use or disclose confidential information learned through 
consultation with the prospective client, subject to exceptions not germane to this Chapter. In 
possession of a prospective client’s confidential information, a lawyer is subject to constraints in 
representing clients whose interests are materially adverse to the prospective client’s.31 Likewise, 
a lawyer owes duties to a prospective client concerning property in the lawyer’s custody.32 To 
the extent the lawyer furnishes legal services, the lawyer owes the prospective client a duty of 
reasonable care.33 Contracts in which clients or prospective clients express advance consent to 
conflicts—with the lawyer’s own interests or representation of other clients—that may later 
emerge in the relationship are effective only when the client is fully informed and the lawyer 
reasonably believes no client’s interest will be adversely affected.34   
 
30RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 (3) and cmt. b (AM. 
LAW INST. 2000) (stating that “[a] lawyer is a fiduciary ....”). 
31 Id. § 15(1)(a) & (2). 
32Id. § 15(1)(b). 
33Id. § 15(1)(c). 
34MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). On the efficacy of 
general open-ended waivers, compare Galdene Labs., L.P. v. Activis Mid Atl. LLC, 927 F. Supp. 
2d 390 (N.D. Tex. 2013)(denying motion to disqualify counsel subject to unrelated conflict 
pertaining to current client; client gave informed consent to open-ended general waiver that 
would ordinarily be ineffective, but acted through general counsel who frequently retained 
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 The same suite of duties applies even when no lawyer-client relationship eventuates. And 
why? Sharing confidential information is a frequent linchpin in seeking legal services, situating 
prospective clients much like clients. The vulnerability that follows for clients, once confidential 
information has been shared, seems essential to a relationship with a lawyer, even when the 
relationship is tentative or prospective or the client is sophisticated. And when a lawyer gives 
advice or otherwise furnishes legal services to a prospective client, the recipient is likely to rely, 
perhaps by failing to form a lawyer-client relationship either with the advice-giver or another 
lawyer. 
 As their clients’ agents, lawyers are distinctive. They are officers of the court and 
members of a largely self-regulated profession as well as agents whose representative role comes 
packaged with other significant functions, most importantly furnishing advice to clients on a 
confidential basis. Their distinct duties—including those owed to prospective clients regardless 
of whether a lawyer-client relationship is formed—stem from the lawyer’s status as a lawyer. 
Revisited in this light, brokers—the agents with which this section began—are disanalogous in 
significant ways. Any duty a broker owes a customer concerning investment advice is distinct 
 
outside counsel, including large law firms) with Celgene Corp. v. KV Pharma. Co., 2008 WL 
2937415 *8 (D.N.J. 2008)(granting motion to disqualify when retention agreement included 
comparable waiver language; agreement did not manifest informed consent because it did not 
specify types of conflicts, such as concurrent representation of generic pharmaceutical 
companies in patent cases). Galdene and Celgene both shift the burden—ordinarily borne by the 
party moving to disqualify counsel—to the law firm resisting disqualification. 
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from the agency duties the broker owes in executing an order from the customer to buy or sell.35 
In contrast, the structure of a lawyer-client relationship, including one in formation, situates the 
client or prospective client in a position that entails sharing confidential information with the 
vulnerabilities that follow. Nonetheless, might a broker ever duties as a sort of “agent-in-
waiting” before receiving an order for execution?      
IV. The status of “agent-in-waiting”?  
 The imposition of duties (whether or not deemed fiduciary in character) that anticipate 
the formation of an agency relationship could be conceptualized in several ways, each with its 
distinct rationale. First, pre-agency duties may be grounded in the application of other bodies of 
law. These include tort law, which furnishes the basis for brokerage-firm liability to prospective 
clients in the “bad broker” cases discussed above. Second, pre-agency fiduciary duty may be 
grounded in a fact-specific, case-by-case determination of whether a particular relationship was 
characterized by trust invited by one party and justifiably reposed by the other. Lawyers’ duties 
to prospective clients, discussed above, operate categorically but the underlying justifications 
resemble those for the imposition of fact-specific fiduciary duties. Third, pre-agency fiduciary 
duties could follow from treating a relationship as an instance of a category in which all 
relationships are fiduciary ones, perhaps termed “agency-in-waiting.”36 Grounding pre-agency 
duties in a distinct state that anticipates the formation of an agency relationship calls into 
question whether the duties arise when no agency relationship ensues. Perhaps only a limited 
suite of duties follows; recall that a lawyer owes duties to a prospective client but not the 
 
35In re Enron, 238 F. Supp. 3d at 843.  
36Thanks to Richard Brooks for urging me to develop the implications. 
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broader-reaching fiduciary duties owed to a client. Statutes and regulatory provisions may also 
be relevant to shape or dominate analysis and resolution. The sections that follow explore pre-
agency duties for two significant groups: de facto and de jure corporate officers, and brokers. 
A.  Corporate officers, de facto and de jure  
 An actor who assumes to act as an agent in a formally defined category when requisite 
formalities have not been met—typified by a de facto corporate officer—owes fiduciary duties in 
the de facto phase, which may or may not precede a de jure phase. This is because the actor in 
question has assumed to act as an agent, in de facto officer cases with some appearance of 
rightful occupancy of the office, such as acquiescence by the corporation’s board of directors. 
Thus, the status of de facto officer isn’t an instance of acting as a poseur—purporting to be an 
agent when that’s not true at the time of holding out—or a fiduciary de son tort—unilaterally 
taking on a fiduciary status (or its appearance) without a regular appointment to it.37 By 
definition, de facto officers do not act unilaterally in assuming a particular office. The 
consequences for the corporation are closely linked to apparent authority because it’s requisite 
that a de facto officer, in exercising the functions of an office, reasonably appear to hold the 
office.38 To exercise the functions of an office in interactions with third parties as a corporation’s 
 
37On poseurs, see Deborah A. DeMott, The Poseur as Agent, in AGENCY LAW IN 
COMMERCIAL PRACTICE 35-54 (Danny Busch et al. eds., 2016). On fiduciaries de son tort, see 
Andrew S. Gold, The State as a Wrongful Fiduciary, in FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT 183, 190-93 
(Evan J. Criddle et al. eds. 2018). 
38See Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc., 330 S.E.2d 649, 655 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985)(individual 
found to have acted as an officer signed corporations’ income tax returns as corporate president 
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representative is to act as the corporation’s agent. Like formal appointment or election to an 
office, whether an agent exercises an office’s functions is readily determinable.   
 Returning to the potential status of “agent-in-waiting,” consider the position of an 
individual whose announced appointment as a corporate officer will become effective as a future 
time, who, in the meantime, prepares to undertake the office’s responsibilities. In In re the Walt 
Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, the court held that the corporation’s new President did not owe 
fiduciary duties before assuming office, including duties concerning the terms of his employment 
agreement.39 Not having purported to assume the duties of the presidency before his announced 
start date, the officer-in-waiting was not a de facto officer; his activities to prepare himself for 
the office did not amount to exercising its functions.40 Additionally, the facts fall short of the 
bases on which courts impose fact-specific fiduciary duties. More generally, whether an actor 
has entered the realm of corporate officeholders and their fiduciary duties—even as a de facto 
officer—is relatively amenable to a bright-line or toggle-switch determination.41       
 
and assistant treasurer, had input into corporations’ formation and operation, and took over their 
management). On de facto officers in general, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.03, 
cmt. e.  
39906 A.2d 27, 48-49 (Del. 2006). I testified as an expert witness on other issues in this 
litigation. 
40Id. at 41 n. 14. Both determinations were made on the basis of a summary judgment 
record. See In re the Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 2004 WL 2050138 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 
2004). 
41Along these lines, the trial court observed, “[a] bright line rule whereby officers and 
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 B.  Brokers 
       In contrast with corporate officeholders, the facts of the leading brokerage case, Martin v. 
Heinold Commodities, Inc.,42 illustrate situations in which multiple bases for pre-agency 
fiduciary duties may be present. In Martin, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a commodities 
broker had a duty to explain the nature of its opaque fee and commission structures to 
prospective clients. The court stressed that “where the very creation of the agency relationship 
involves a special trust and confidence on the part of the principal in the subsequent fair dealing 
of the agent, the prospective agent may be under a fiduciary duty to disclose the terms of his 
employment as an agent.”43 It’s not clear whether the imposition of the duty of disclosure applies 
at a categorical level and thus becomes applicable when the parties intend to create a relationship 
of a particular type, or whether the duty applies (and the prospective agent’s failure to make the 
requisite clarifying disclosure breaches the duty) only following a case-specific inquiry into the 
qualities of the relationship between a particular broker and its prospective principal. If the latter, 
a sophisticated or experienced investor could confront a higher barrier in establishing that the 
 
directors become fiduciaries only when they are officially installed, and receive the formal 
investiture of authority that accompanies such office or directorship, is a more reasonable and 
desirable rule” than imposing fiduciary duties at an earlier point, which could prove 
indeterminate in practice. 2004 WL 2050138 at * 4. Likewise, a corporation’s directors and 
controlling shareholder are not as such agents of the corporation. See Lyman Johnson, this 
volume (conference draft p. 8, sentence beginning section B).  
42643 N.E.2d 734 (Ill. 1995). 
43Id. at 740. 
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broker owed a duty, on the assumption that such an investor, acting skeptically and at arms 
length, would inquire about fee and commission structures. Regardless of an investor’s degree of 
sophistication, the broker possesses an informational advantage, here concerning the terms and 
operation of its fee and commission structure; a sophisticated investor might be expected to 
realize this fact, ask questions, and consider going elsewhere for brokerage services if unsatisfied 
by the broker’s answers. 
 Like securities brokers, commodities brokers are agents who operate in a context shaped 
by regulation, which does not explicitly or comprehensively resolve all questions that may arise. 
General agency law could be salient to a practice of some brokers, anticipatory front-running. 
Regulation requires that commodities brokerage firms adopt internal prohibitions against front-
running by individual brokers, that is, practices that prioritize trades in proprietary accounts or 
accounts in which a broker has an interest, ahead of executable customer orders in the same 
commodity. By front-running a customer’s order an agent competes with the principal (the 
customer), contravening the agent’s fiduciary duty of loyalty unless the customer consents.44 
Front-running can also injure the principal when a broker’s front-running transaction is large 
enough to move the market price. If the broker profits through the front-running strategy, the 
broker also nets more from the transaction than the commission to which the customer agreed. In 
any event, by accepting or undertaking to execute an order to buy or sell on behalf of a customer, 
the broker has consented to and formed an agency relationship with the customer and thus owes 
fiduciary duties to the customer as its principal. 
 In contrast, anticipatory front-running could be prompted by a prospective customer’s 
 
44RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05(2) cmt. c. 
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request for a quote from a commodities broker, not an executable order. Informational 
asymmetries are present in the relationship because the broker has access to real-time 
information about the relevant market that the customer lacks, including information about order 
flow. Commodities regulation itself imposes no explicit prohibition on “trading ahead” of 
prospective customer orders, as opposed to orders that are “executable.” However, commodities 
regulation in the United States now includes a prohibition on insider trading—narrower than the 
counterpart applicable to insider trading in securities—that proscribes the use of misappropriated 
information in breach of a pre-existing duty.45 The reasoning in Martin could ground liability in 
a pre-existing duty, either because the circumstances surrounding a particular request for a quote 
led the customer to repose trust and confidence in the broker, or because circumstances or 
structures generally in commodities markets necessitate that prospective customers repose trust 
and confidence in brokers.  
 To be sure, anticipatory front-running is riskier for a broker than conventional forms of 
front-running because if the request for a quote is not followed by an order the broker may hold 
 
45Commodities Exchange Act §§ 4b(a) and (c); 7 U.S.C. §§ 6b and (c). The Dodd-Frank 
Act amended the language of section 6 (c) in 2010 to grant the Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) authority to prohibit the use of manipulative or deceptive devices or 
contrivances in contravention of CFTC regulationss. The amendment imposes no affirmative 
disclosure obligations except where necessary to prevent or correct a misleading statement. The 
CFTC brought and settled its first insider trading proceedings in 2015 and 2016, both against 
traders who front-ran their employers’ proprietary trading plans. In re Motazedi, CFTC No. 16-
02 (Dec. 2015) and In re Ruggles, CFTC No. 16-34 (Sept. 29, 2016). 
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an illiquid position. This reduces the likelihood that the broker will profit through front-running 
as well as the likelihood of injury, here to a prospective customer who may never place an order 
to be executed. If so, grounding “agent-in-waiting” liability in the prospective principal’s 
vulnerability to injury, does not seem compelling in this scenario, nor does a commodities broker 
as such, unlike a lawyer, occupy a status that engenders fiduciary obligations to prospective 
clients. In contrast, consider the vulnerabilities created by agreeing to co-own a business—which 
creates a general partnership, as discussed above—and the likelihood that the partners will share 
share ideas well before they create a formal (and limited-liability) business firm. Sharing at “the 
dawn of the relationship,” in Christine Hurt’s terminology, is both crucial to future viability and 
a source of vulnerability for the partners, who risk betrayal by each other. Within this “danger 
zone,” the law categorically assigns the relationship among business co-owners to general 
partnership and its imposition of fiduciary duties.46  
 C.  Implications of ubiquity of agency relationships 
 As one court recently noted, agency relationships are characterized by “mundane 
ubiquity,”47 given their presence in a range of recurrent situations. Although agency relationships 
are governed by general doctrines—including those defining an agent’s fiduciary duties—it’s 
unsurprising that at their temporal edges the duties imposed on agents-in-waiting are not 
 
46 Hurt, supra note 6, at (ms.) 55. Likewise, the absence of a written agreement for M&A 
advisory services does not necessarily bar the conclusion that a bank that furnishes advice and 
other services owes a fiduciary duty to the party engaging it. See Andrew Tuch, in this volume 
(9/25 draft at 7, n. 31-33). 
47Great Minds, 886 F.3d at 95. 
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uniform. Creating a lawyer-client relationship in itself likely creates vulnerabilities for the 
prospective client, given the need to share confidential information with the lawyer to form the 
relationship coupled with the likelihood that the prospective client will rely on any advice the 
lawyer gives. Thus, as a categorical matter lawyers owe duties to prospective clients, including 
constraints in the representation of other clients with materially adverse interests. Brokers, in 
contrast, are not categorically subject to fiduciary (or fiduciary-like) duties to prospective 
customers; and it’s not evident why imposing such duties would be when a prospective customer 
never places an order. As Martin illustrates, a court may be persuaded that the specifics of a 
relationship broker’s relationship to a customer warrant the imposition of fiduciary duties (in that 
case, a duty of disclosure), based either on the nature of the relationship and the vulnerability it 
creates for the client, or on informational advantages possessed by the broker and used to 
disadvantage the client. Separately, for some recurrent situations, articulating a bright-line rule is 
preferable to case-by-case inquiry into factual specifics. Thus, lawyers owe duties to prospective 
clients as a categorical matter; corporate officers-in-waiting are not subject to fiduciary duties 
unless or until they purport to perform the functions of the office. Up to then, the potential for 
abuse and opportunism by all officers-in-waiting isn’t compelling enough to offset the benefits 
of a clear line of demarcation.48                 
V. Duties on the periphery of termination 
 Terminating an agency relationship does not end all duties that agent and principal owe to 
each other, most obviously duties imposed by an enforceable contract between them. 
 
48For comparable reasoning as applied to determinations of fact-based fiduciary status, 
see Kelly, supra note 3, at 11-12. 
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Additionally, both principal and agent hold unilateral power to terminate the relationship. The 
fact that either or both contemplate ending the relationship does not eliminate their duties, 
although the agent’s continuing duty of loyalty to the principal co-exists—if awkwardly—with 
any undisclosed plan to depart and preparations toward that end. Consider first ongoing duties 
that survive termination, then duties owed when either agent or principal, or both, contemplate 
exit.  
A. Duties following termination 
     Distinct from duties imposed by contract, an agent’s duty not to use or disclose the now-
former principal’s confidential information for the agent’s own purposes or those of a third party 
survives termination of the agency relationship,49 as does the agent’s duty not to retain or use the 
principal’s property without the principal’s consent.50 It is irrelevant whether the agent has 
memorized the information or retained a physical record of it.51 Whether a former agent’s 
disclosure of confidential information breaches the agent’s duty to the principal depends on the 
agent’s motivation or purpose in making disclosure. In Dirks v. S.E.C., in which a former 
corporate officer told an investment analyst that the corporation was rife with fraud, the  
revelation did not breach the former officer’s fiduciary duties. He sought to expose fraud, not to 
realize a monetary benefit or confer a gift on the analyst.52         
 
 
49RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05(2) & cmt. c.  
50 Id. § 8.05(1). 
 
51Id. cmt. c; accord, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1995). 
52 463 U.S. 646, 667 (1983). Thanks to Sung Hui Kim for highlighting this case. 
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     Following the termination of an agency relationship, the now-former agent owes the 
principal a duty to cease acting as an agent or purporting to do so,53 even when the principal’s 
termination of the agent’s authority is in breach of contract. Agents who do not follow what 
could be termed the principal’s countermanding or final instruction act wrongfully toward the 
principal by persisting. But within agency’s taxonomy of duties, the agent’s refusal to comply—
for example, by remaining in possession of property the agent manages on the principal’s 
behalf—breaches not a fiduciary duty but a duty of performance.54 This distinction carries 
implications for remedies against the now-former agent who, of course, is no longer an agent 
subject to the full suite of an agent’s duties. In particular, an agent’s breach of a duty of loyalty is 
a basis on which the principal may seek forfeiture of commissions or other compensation paid or 
payable to the agent during the period of disloyalty, for which the duration may be disputed.55 
Characterized as disobedience to an instruction from the principal, the agent’s persistence would 
not be disloyal conduct that forfeits the agent’s right to compensation for prior service.56 Likely 
more significant to most former principals, a now-former agent lacks apparent authority to bind 
the principal to a third party who knows or has good reason to know that the agency relationship 
has ended.57    
 
  
53Id. § 8.09, cmt. b. 
54DeMott, Fiduciary Character of Agency, supra note 16 at 334; Strategis Asset 
Valuation & Mgmt., Inc. v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 805 F. Supp. 1544 (D. Colo. 1992).  
55RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01, cmt. (d)(2). 
56Strategis, 805 F. Supp. at 1551-52. 
57Sullivan v. Pugh, 814 S.E.2d 117, 120-121 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018)(purported transferee 
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 Post-termination, a principal’s duties to a former agent—beyond those created by 
contract—are fewer in number, just as they are throughout the relationship. This seeming 
imbalance reflects a basic consequence of agency itself: the relationship situates the agent (and 
only the agent) in a representative position to take action with legal consequences for the 
principal, and often in proximity to the principal’s property.58 Nonetheless, a principal may 
engage in conduct that, although not conventionally tortious, will foreseeably inflict loss on a 
now-former agent. In Shen v. Leo A. Daly Co., the principal terminated the agent it had engaged 
as its general manager for Taiwan, which requires that the principal officially designate a 
“responsible person” to conduct business and affix that agent’s signature-equivalent to tax 
returns.59 Following the termination, the principal did not remove its designation of its now-
former agent as its responsible person despite warnings from the agent that the failure might 
subject the agent to adverse legal consequences in the event of tax disputes between Taiwan and 
the principal. Following a final adverse tax determination, the principal refused to pay the 
amount claimed, prompting Taiwanese authorities to notify the former agent that he was 
forbidden to leave the country pending resolution of the country’s tax dispute with the principal. 
The court held that the principal was subject to liability for loss suffered by its former agent, 
including attorneys’ fees he incurred. Rejecting the former agent’s argument that the principal’s 
 
of legal and equitable interests in claims or proceeds stemming from fire damage to transferor’s 
property had good reason to know transferor’s former president lacked authority to bind it). 
58RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, Ch. 8, Topic 2, Introductory Note. 
59222 F.3d 472 (8th Cir. 2000)(applying Nebraska law). 
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conduct constituted false imprisonment,60 the court held that the principal breached the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing it owed its former agent, which, in the court’s analysis, was tortious.  
 Necessarily co-existing with the principal’s ongoing power to terminate the 
relationship,61 the scope of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is crimped as a consequence. 
Whether the duty is embraced and how it is formulated vary across jurisdictions. Framing the 
inquiry within contract law, a recent Australian case declined to imply a duty of mutual trust and 
confidence that would be breached when an employer undercut a soon-to-be-former employee’s 
ability to utilize helpful mechanisms created by the employer. In Commonwealth Bank v. Barker, 
the bank decided to make the employee’s position redundant and to terminate his employment in 
about four weeks. The bank also held out hope that the employee could be redeployed within its 
organization.62 His manager sent the employee an email urging him to work with a career-
support officer, who also emailed the employee, both using the employee’s bank email address. 
However, the employee’s access to his bank email account was terminated at the time of the 
redundancy notice; he alleged that, as a consequence, he did not become aware of a position 
description that may have fitted him. The court rejected the implication of a term of mutual trust 
and confidence, instead characterizing employment as a domain dominated by legislation. The 
court explicitly declined to follow authority from the United Kingdom, which held that former 
(and innocent) employees of a scandal-ridden bank stated legally viable claims in the bank’s 
 
60The court found that “the country of Taiwan is clearly too great an area within which to 
be falsely imprisoned.” Id. at 478. 
61RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.15 cmt. b. 
62[2014] HCA 32. Thanks to Matthew Conaglen for alerting me to this case. 
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winding-up proceeding. The U.K. court held that the bank owed its employees an implied duty of 
trust and confidence that would be breached by mismanagement that leaves employees 
unemployable elsewhere due to the stigma created by their former employer.63   
 B.  Preparing for termination 
 Agents and principals who plan to end an agency relationship do not owe each other a 
duty to disclose that fact, potentially giving each the advantage of an informational asymmetry in 
continued dealings with the other. Although (subject to exceptions not relevant here) an agent 
owes the principal a duty to disclose facts that are material to the agent’s duties to the principal,64 
the duty does not require advance warning that the agent will renounce authority. Additionally, if 
the parties negotiate over the terms of their relationship—to continue it with modifications or 
terminate on mutually-agreed terms65—the principal and the agent likely negotiate to further 
their own interests as each then understands them.  
This reality requires some tempering of the content or scope of the agent’s overarching 
duty of loyalty to the principal, which is “to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters 
connected with the agency relationship.”66 By participating in the negotiations, the principal has 
not consented to the agent’s self-interested stance because the principal does not know all 
 
63Malik v. Bank of Credit & Commerce Int’l S.A., [1998] A.C. 20 (H.L.). See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.15, reporter’s notes (citing Malik).  
64RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11 
65Id. § 3.09. 
66Id. § 8.01. 
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material facts, which include the agent’s undisclosed objectives and negotiating strategy.67 More 
plausibly, the agent’s conduct in renegotiating the relationship’s terms falls outside its scope, as 
would the agent’s knowledge of the fact that the agent plans to renounce authority and thereby 
end the relationship. To be sure, the agent’s actions in negotiating are “connected with” the 
agency relationship in a causal or factual sense because the relationship still exists, but the 
agent’s actions are insufficiently within its scope to justify requiring that the agent renegotiate 
solely for the principal’s benefit. The principal, knowing the identity of the party with whom it’s 
negotiating, would not reasonably expect the agent to bargain toward achieving the principal’s 
benefit, as opposed to the agent’s own objectives. And just as the principal holds unilateral 
power to terminate the relationship, so does the agent. Accordingly, a principal may try to 
structure incentives to keep key agents on board and motivate them, especially once they  
become aware that the relationship will end.68   
 Likewise, an agent may make preparations to compete with the principal once the agency 
relationship ends. Agency law defines “preparations” to exclude conduct—albeit preparatory to 
 
67C&E Servs., Inc. v. Ashland, 601 F. Supp. 2d 262, 270 (D.D.C. 2009). 
68See, e.g., Act II Jewelry, LLC v. Wooten, 301 F. Supp. 3d 905 (N.D. Ill. 
2018)(incentive bonus agreement with key manager adopted following firm’s announcement of 
wind-down of business division for which manager responsible). In Act II, after learning the 
plan, the manager incorporated a competing business prior to her termination date. The court 
found a genuine issue of material fact on whether the manager owed the LLC a fiduciary duty, 
stressing that under general agency law employees of Delaware LLCs owe fiduciary duties to 
their employers. Id. at 916-17.    
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competition—too proximately situated to the principal’s business operations and assets, 
including soliciting existing customers or employees of the principal to follow the agent.69 Such 
conduct is analogous to an agent’s extraction of the principal’s property or confidential 
information for subsequent competitive use, which would breach the agent’s fiduciary duties.70 
Beyond instances of active solicitation, an agent—especially one positioned within a principal’s 
organization—may be better situated to design a competitive plan than are potential third-party 
competitors, who may lack established ties to the principal’s suppliers or customers, as well as 
ties to the principal’s personnel. Agents may also be able to time their departures to inflict 
maximum competitive damage on the principal. In extreme cases—such as calculated en masse 
departures at a sensitive time for the principal—courts may determine that the agents’ conduct 
went beyond mere “planning” to compete to the commencement of a competitive business while 
still engaged by the principal.71          
 The general rule permitting preparations to compete does not formally differentiate 
among employee-agents, whose roles range from providing non-managerial services to broad 
responsibilities as an entity’s executive officers. It’s hard to generalize from reported cases 
across jurisdictions. For example, one court categorically treated preparations to compete by 
corporate officers as breaches of fiduciary duty.72 Some courts impose a heightened duty on 
officers, in particular a duty not to act in ways that impede the firm’s ability to continue in 
 
69RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.04 cmts. b & c. 
70Id. § 8.05. 
71RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.04, cmt. c. 
72Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991). 
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business.73 Officers who agree with each other to compete post-termination may thereby breach 
their fiduciary duties, especially when their agreement is colored by extreme or egregious 
conduct.74 A fair generalization about many cases is that “actions of corporate executives are 
likely to receive particular scrutiny.”75 And sometimes-subtle interactions between motive and 
conduct can situate post-termination disputes over pre-departure preparations beyond bright-line 
determinations, into the realm of fact-intensive inquiry. 
 As this Chapter illustrates, agents are heterogenous in the specifics of the duties they 
owe, including those connected to termination. Recall the discussion above of a lawyer’s duties 
in dealing with a prospective client. Although a lawyer may terminate the representation of a 
client, the lawyer’s owes the client a duty to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to 
protect the client’s interests, including giving notice to the client of the termination or impending 
termination.76 In contrast, agency law does not impose a general duty on either principals or 
agents to act in a harm-minimizing fashion, as opposed to the more minimal duties surveyed in 
this essay; the court’s justification for imposing liability on the principal in Shen is ingenious and 
 
73Veco Corp v. Babcock, 611 N.E.2d 1054, 1059 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
74RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.04, cmt. c. 
75RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.04, rep. n. to cmt d.  
76RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 8.04, cmt. c. See Maples v. 
Thomas, 565 U.S. 266 (2012)(lawyers for death-row inmate breached duties to client and 
terminated agency relationship by accepting employment that prevented ongoing service to 
client, without giving notice to client or court; unrepresented, client not bound by failure to file 
timely appeal). 
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unusual. And exiting from an agency relationship frees the agent to compete with the principal 
and take other actions adverse to the principal’s interests. Lawyers, in contrast, owe duties to 
former clients that constrain their rights to undertake the representation of parties with materially 
adverse interests in the same or a related matter.77 General agency law—the realm of corporate 
officers and brokers—defines duties and the conduct that breaches them in terms that 
accommodate a broader range of actors and activities than would be tolerable in the realm of 
lawyers’ roles and duties. 
VI.  Theoretical implications 
 These dimensions of agency doctrine have implications for scholarly accounts of 
fiduciary law more generally. When the assumed prototype for the general category of actors 
subject to fiduciary duties is a trustee and the prototypical fiduciary institution is a trust,78 agents 
and agency relationships can appear to be discordant, non-conforming, or marginal instances. It’s 
essential to an agency relationship that the principal have the right or power of control over the 
agent—and thus the power to furnish binding instructions on an interim basis—while the extent 
of a principal’s control and how it is exercised can vary widely. An actor who is not subject to 
control of any sort exercised by a principal is not an agent, with the consequence that the parties’ 
relationship is not one of common-law agency.79 But the irreducible requisite of control for 
 
77RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132. 
78See, e.g, D. Gordon Smith, Firms and Fiduciaries, in CONTRACT, STATUS, AND 
FIDUCIARY LAW 293, 308 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds. 2016)(characterizing the trust 
as “the quintessential fiduciary relationship”). 
79Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2666 (2103). 
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agency relationships mean they lack an essential property of fiduciary relationships specified by 
leading theories: possession by an actor of discretionary powers, or the exercise of discretionary 
power over a critical resource of the beneficiary.80 To be sure, an agent has power to disregard 
the principal’s instructions, but agency law does not entitle an agent to treat the bounds of actual 
authority, including the principal’s interim instructions, as mere suggestions or precatory 
expressions that are not binding. 
 As this Chapter demonstrates, fiduciary duties within agency doctrine reflect signal 
characteristics of agency relationships not present in relationships governed by trust-law 
doctrine. A trustee’s duties are tied to the trustee’s exercise or non-exercise of powers as a 
trustee81 and decisions about whether and how to exercise those powers,82 which circumscribes 
their scope and duration, unlike the more fluid duties owed by agents, including former and 
prospective ones. The scope of a trustee’s duty of loyalty focuses on the administration of the 
 
80Julian Velasco, Delimiting Fiduciary Status, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY 
LAW (D. Gordon Smith & Andrew S. Gold, eds. 2018); Alice Woolley, The Lawyer as 
Fiduciary: Defining Private Law Duties in Public Law Relations, U. TORONTO L.J. 285, 309-315 
(2015). For accounts of essential properties, see Paul B. Miller, The Idea of Status in Fiduciary 
Law, in CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 25, 48 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 
2016); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 
1399 (2002). 
813 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 70 (AM. LAW INST. 2007) 
82Id. § 86. 
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trust,83 in contrast to the broader or less specified range of an agent’s duty. Additionally, agency 
doctrine applies to ongoing relationships between two parties whose perspectives and 
preferences may shift over time. Thus it accommodates relationships in which parties may 
bargain with each other on an interim basis to adjust the terms of their relationship going 
forward, each always holding a unilateral power to exit. Relatedly, agency doctrine also 
accommodates the possibility that agents while still employed may take measures to prepare to 
compete with the principal. This is not the structure that underlies a prototypical donative trust, 
which is created by a manifestation of a settlor as a fiduciary relationship through which the 
trustee holds title to property and is subject to duties to deal with the property for the benefit of 
others.84  
 The duties that prospective agents may owe to principals also cast new light on a long-
established dimension of contract law, which “accords parties the freedom to negotiate without 
risk of precontractual liability.”85 The duty of fair dealing that’s generally imposed on parties to 
an existing contract does not reach precontractual negotiations.86 Despite cases and secondary 
 
83Id. § 78. 
841 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2003)(defining a trust as the 
“fiduciary relationship with respect to property, arising from a manifestation of intention to 
create that relationship and subjecting the person who holds title to the property to duties to deal 
with it for the benefit of charity or for one or more persons, at least one of whom is not the sole 
trustee”). 
85E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 189 (4th ed. 2004). 
86Id. 
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authority recognizing a theory of liability grounded in one party’s reasonable reliance 
engendered by negotiations toward a contract that is never concluded, only rarely do litigants in 
the United States seek relief on this basis. Parties engaged in negotiations toward a contract may 
be unaware that justifiable reliance can support liability; or perhaps, as Allan Farnworth 
suggests, parties are generally content with “the common law’s aleatory view of negotiations,” 
which might also reflect broader social disinterest in the outcome of negotiations.87 Against this 
contract-law backdrop, the prospect that agents may owe duties beyond those imposed by tort 
law to prospective principals, or be subject to affirmative duties of disclosure in dealings with 
prospective principals, can appear discordant.88  
 However, both the Martin brokerage precedent and the duties that lawyers owe to 
prospective clients—instances discussed at length above—could be distinguished from 
negotiations toward a paradigmatic bilateral contract. First, consider the structures that particular 
relationships necessitate. Dealings undertaken in anticipation of an agency relationship often 
(and maybe even prototypically) involve informational asymmetries that reflect more than 
disparities in expertise. In Martin, as in the hypothetical instance of anticipatory front-running, 
the broker had access to material information that was legally unavailable to its prospective 
principal. Agents—like lawyers—whose functions require knowledge of their clients’ or 
principals’ confidential information typically deal with a party, a prospective client, who is made 
vulnerable by sharing information necessary to proceed toward an agency relationship. 
Separately, consider the nature of the prospective agent’s activity. The scope of pre-agency 
 
87Id. at 198-199. 
88I owe this insight to Norio Higuchi. 
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duties could place them outside “negotiations” as a category of activity; the disclosure of fee and 
commission structures that Martin may require could precede negotiations, a distinct phase of 
activity. Additionally, by front-running on the basis of a client’s order or request for a quote, a 
broker is not negotiating with a client or prospective client, just exploiting an informational 
advantage. Finally, and much more broadly, negotiations toward an agency relationship could be 
treated as a basis for the imposition of fiduciary duties full stop (or categorically), but such 
breadth is inconsistent with much decisional law as well as with more tailored rationales that 
ground pre-agency duties in structures that entail vulnerability or induce reliance.   
 Duties owed at the temporal edges of agency relationships also have implications for 
general accounts of fiduciary duties, even apart from those premised on assuming a trust to be 
the prototype of a fiduciary relationship. Some accounts of the fiduciary duty of loyalty 
emphasize a cognitive dimension, that is, a focus on how the fiduciary deliberates and the 
connection between such deliberation and the fiduciary’s actions. In recent scholarship, Stephen 
Galoob and Ethan Leib demonstrate that a fiduciary’s cognition can bear on whether the 
fiduciary has satisfied duties of loyalty imposed by the law,89 building on their earlier work 
identifying loyalty, deliberation, conscientiousness, and robustness as the cognitive dimensions 
of loyalty.90 A cognitive account of fiduciary loyalty provides a different framework for 
resolving issues when an agent prepares to compete with the principal before the agency 
 
89Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Loyalty, Inside and Out, 92 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 69 (2018). 
90Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique, 125 YALE 
L. J. 1820 (2016). 
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relationship has come to an end, or even engages in a calculated assessment of whether to quit. 
For Galoob and Leib, the fiduciary duty of loyalty requires robust commitment; preparing to 
compete could betray the principal, or attempt betrayal, as a consequence of the agent’s 
abandoned or weakened commitment to the principal.91 To the extent agency law tolerates 
preparations to compete, and pre-preparation stragegizing over exit, there’s a limit to the fit 
between cognitivist accounts and the law.  
 Additionally, to encompass duties on the peripheries of agency relationships within a 
cognitivist account would require deepening the cognitivist account. If an agent plans (or hopes) 
to exit from the relationship and does not disclose that fact to the principal, is the non-disclosure 
an instance of disloyalty that makes forfeiture of compensation due the agent an available 
remedy to the principal? Alternatively, the structure of agency itself—a fiduciary relationship 
that empowers both parties to act unilaterally to end the relationship—may mean that conduct 
will often reflect a mix of motivations and that the retrospective lens of litigation will often 
require factually intensive scrutiny. 
VII. Conclusion   
 Agency relationships, so quotidian, can elude theoretical frameworks premised on other 
types of legal relationships. The reasons why prospective agents might owe fiduciary duties to 
principals, and the status of those duties when an agent plans to terminate an agency relationship, 
have broader implications for accounts of fiduciary obligation within business firms.          
   
 
91Galoob & Leib, supra note __, at 101. The authors acknowledge that agency law 
“suggests ... some room for permissible preparation....” Id. n. 111. 
  
-37- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
